

the prayer, the routine requests through the morning hour be granted and the Senate then resume consideration of the Craig amendment numbered 2316 to the NATO enlargement treatment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I further ask that the time following the prayer until 12 noon be equally divided for debate on the Craig amendment; further, that at 12 noon the Craig amendment be temporarily set aside and the votes on or in relation to the amendment follow the two stacked rollcall votes previously ordered to occur at approximately 3 p.m.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

PROGRAM

Mr. COATS. Mr. President, for the information of all Senators, tomorrow morning at 11 a.m. the Senate will resume consideration of the Craig amendment numbered 2316 to the NATO enlargement treaty.

Under the previous order, at noon Senator MOYNIHAN will be recognized to offer an amendment under a 1-hour time agreement.

Following the debate on the Moynihan amendment, Senator WARNER will be recognized to offer an amendment under a 2-hour time agreement.

Following the debate on the Warner amendment, at approximately 3 p.m., at the conclusion of that debate, the Senate will proceed to three stacked rollcall votes.

The first vote will be on or in relation to the Moynihan amendment, followed by a vote on or in relation to the Warner amendment, followed then by a vote on or in relation to the Craig amendment.

As a reminder, a unanimous consent agreement was reached which limits the amendments to the NATO treaty. It is hoped that any Senator still intending to offer an amendment under the consent agreement will do so early tomorrow to allow the Senate to complete action on this important document by early tomorrow evening.

Also, if available, the Senate may consider the conference report to accompany the supplemental appropriations bill.

Therefore, Senators should expect rollcall votes throughout the Thursday session of the Senate.

Mr. President, that is an ambitious schedule. Senators are urged to be timely. Senators are urged, those who may have additional amendments to the NATO enlargement treaty, to make those amendments known to leadership, and hopefully reasonable time requests can be entered into. A number of Senators are making very important official business commitments for the weekend, and the more definite the plans can be about the schedule tomorrow, the more expeditiously those commitments can be undertaken.

ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT

Mr. COATS. Mr. President, if there is no further business to come before the Senate, I now ask that the Senate stand in adjournment under the previous order, following the remarks of Senator CONRAD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The Senator from North Dakota.

Mr. CONRAD. I thank the Chair. I thank my colleague from Indiana as well.

EXECUTIVE SESSION

PROTOCOLS TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY OF 1949 ON ACCESSION OF POLAND, HUNGARY, AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC

The Senate continued with the consideration of the treaty.

Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the resolution of ratification for NATO enlargement.

In my view, there are four questions that must be answered in the affirmative in order to support NATO expansion.

No. 1, are the risks to relations with Russia and arms control acceptable?

No. 2, are we sure what NATO expansion will cost and who will pay for it?

No. 3, has a compelling argument been made as to why expansion is necessary?

No. 4, are we certain that enlargement will not have perverse consequences, fostering instability in Eastern Europe and perpetuating the danger from Russia's tactical nuclear arsenal?

I am convinced, after thorough review, that the answers to these questions are all no.

I start with the observation of Mr. George Kennan, perhaps the foremost observer of U.S.-Russian relations. Mr. Kennan, who was, after all, the architect of the containment policy that proved so effective, said in a *Newsday* editorial on March 15 that, "Expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-world war era."

Mr. President and colleagues, let me repeat. George Kennan, the architect of containment, said as recently as March 15 that, "Expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-world war era."

That is a pretty serious statement by someone who has great credibility based on his record. He is not alone in that assessment. Former Senator Nunn, who enjoyed enormous respect on both sides of the aisle in this Chamber, has discussed a dangerous contradiction at the center of the argument for expansion, saying that while enlargement is intended to protect former Soviet satellites, nothing else is as likely to remilitarize Russia and endanger those very countries as NATO enlargement.

Senator Nunn is not alone. We are hearing from leaders in Russia their

warnings to us not to proceed. I recently met—with a group of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives—with Alexi Arbatov, who is deputy chairman of the Duma's defense committee. He told us, "If you proceed with NATO enlargement, you are handing a powerful issue to the radicals in Russia. You are energizing the extreme nationalists in Russia, and you are weakening the forces for democracy."

Mr. President, we should not lightly dismiss the warnings of committed democrats in Russia like Alexi Arbatov and others who have given us similar warnings. I think it says a great deal that the primary architects of American strategy during the cold war, George Kennan and Paul Nitze, have cautioned the Senate against ratification and NATO expansion.

Nearly 50 years ago, as successive heads of the State Department's policy planning staff during the Truman Administration, Kennan and Nitze understood that containment of the Soviet Union was critically important to the free world. Today, they have told us that NATO expansion is a mistake.

I believe the stakes are very high. Remilitarization in Russia is a serious threat. Avoiding this outcome should be our priority, not enlarging NATO.

The first casualty of our expansion of NATO may very well be progress on arms control. I know that many of my colleagues do not like to be in a position where it seems the Senate's decisions about foreign policy are dependent on reaction in Russia. It smacks of blackmail. The problem with this thinking is that it assumes that something we need is being held hostage.

As I have discussed, there simply is no compelling argument for why we must expand NATO. Therefore, to risk relations with Russia and arms control are not acceptable. The Duma's expeditious ratification of START II should be our priority. In pursuing our national interest we are in no way giving in to Russian blackmail.

I might add it is not just a question of START II ratification, but it is also clearly in our national interest to make a priority of reducing the threat from the tactical nuclear weapons that are in the Russian arsenal.

By rejecting NATO enlargement, we would simply be choosing not to embark on a dangerous and unjustified course of enlarging NATO and would avoid making a terrible mistake in the course of U.S.-Russian relations.

The second point I think needs to be made is that NATO enlargement brings unknown costs. The case for enlargement becomes increasingly suspect when we look at questions related to the costs and who will bear them.

I direct the attention of my colleagues to a chart on the various estimates that have been issued with respect to the cost of NATO enlargement. The Congressional Budget Office issued an estimate of \$21 billion to \$125 billion. The Rand Corporation said the

cost would be \$10 billion to \$110 billion. The first Clinton administration estimate was \$27 billion to \$35 billion. NATO itself has put a price tag of \$1.5 billion on expansion. And the second Clinton administration estimate was \$1.5 billion.

You talk about a wide-ranging estimate. We have anywhere from \$1.5 billion to \$125 billion. I do not know where the truth lies. I am a member of the Budget Committee, as is the distinguished occupant of the Chair. I think it is fair to say that none of us has a truly credible estimate with respect to the cost of NATO enlargement.

This takes me to another key question. Who is going to pay this tab? I think all of us know these estimates are probably far off the mark. They probably understate in a very serious way the potential costs of NATO enlargement.

The third main point that must be made with regard to NATO enlargement is that no compelling argument for expansion has been made. What is the military threat that we are encountering? After all, NATO is a military alliance. What threat are we defending against by expanding NATO? I see no immediate Russian threat to the Czech Republic, Hungary, or Poland.

We must remember that article V of the North Atlantic Charter states clearly that an attack on any one member nation is to be considered an attack on all. The test for extension of such a guarantee ought to be simple and clear. We must be convinced that the safety of the American people is directly tied to the security of the country in question, and therefore we must defend that country as we would our own. That must be the test.

Clearly, Western Europe's freedom from Soviet domination was central to the survival of our country and of the free world. Article V deterred Moscow by sending an unmistakable message that a Soviet move against Bonn, West Germany, would have been resisted as would an attack on Bismarck, North Dakota. But nearly 10 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Russian army weakened and greatly reduced, and warning times dramatically expanded, I fail to understand why it is immediately imperative that we provide that same guarantee to Budapest, Hungary.

Mr. President, what is our national interest? That is the question before this body. I believe the overarching priority is to further reduce nuclear weapons that are in the Russian arsenal. And the question before the Senate is whether NATO enlargement will slow down the progress towards arms control or will speed it up.

I don't think there is any question that there exists in expanding NATO a clear risk to this true priority. The overwhelming likelihood is that the U.S. vital interest, which is in reducing the threat from the Russian nuclear arsenal, will be harmed. Expanding NATO is not in our interest.

Mr. President, concern about possible instability in Eastern Europe does not justify expansion of NATO. NATO is not the only vehicle for stability in Europe. Other options that deserve review include expansion of the European Union, or reworking the Partnership for Peace or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Expansion of a military alliance is not our only option. In fact, it appears to this Senator that it is the worst option. I think the New York Times put it very well when it stated in a recent editorial: "There is simply no compelling security justification for NATO enlargement."

Fourth point: NATO expansion may have perverse consequences, increasing instability in Eastern Europe and perpetuating the danger from Russia's tactical nuclear arsenal. The impact of expansion on Eastern Europe and proliferation are perhaps the least studied of all aspects of this issue. But these are some of the most important concerns. After all, stability in Eastern Europe and the safety of our country is why we are debating NATO enlargement on the Senate floor tonight.

I am very concerned that NATO enlargement could actually increase the danger in Eastern Europe. As former Senator Nunn has indicated, expansion could create the very danger from Russia that it is intended to prevent. Expanding NATO to foster stability could have the perverse result of increasing the danger to the former Soviet satellites that we decide not to include. By not including some countries while welcoming others, Russia might well conclude that some countries in Eastern Europe are less important to us than others, and therefore easier to intimidate. Let us not draw new lines in Eastern Europe without serious thought about their consequences.

NATO expansion may additionally drive remilitarization and arms build-ups. We are asking Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to significantly increase their defense budgets. How can we expect their neighbors to respond? How can we expect Russia to respond? Just as the Russian extreme nationalists are predicting, it would appear that NATO expansion would have the effect of tipping the conventional balance in Europe even further against Russia.

This is what the Russian forces for democracy are warning us against. They are saying: "Don't you understand that if you proceed with NATO enlargement, those who are the most radical elements in Russia, those who are the extreme nationalists, will seize on this and they will look to the capability of this expanded military alliance and they will say the capability of NATO is to put tanks on our border?"

We will answer, in the United States: "But NATO is not an offensive military alliance; it is defensive in nature."

And those who are the extreme nationalists and the radicals in Russia will respond: "NATO says it is a defen-

sive alliance, but why are they putting tanks on our border? We don't know what the long-term intentions of NATO are," they will argue, "but we do know NATO's capability—and that capability is to put tanks on our border."

How will that be used politically in Russia? How will that be used in a post-Yeltsin era? Will it strengthen the hardliners and those who argue for remilitarization? Or will it strengthen the forces for democracy and a market economy? I do not think it takes any great analysis to figure out the result in Russia or how it will be used politically. Those in Russia who argue for democracy, who argue for arms control and arms reductions, who argue for a market economy, they are warning us that we are weakening them, and that we are strengthening the forces for remilitarization.

Mr. President, I also believe NATO enlargement could perpetuate the danger from Russia's tactical nuclear arsenal. According to General Habiger, the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, Russia has 7,000 to 12,000 tactical nuclear weapons. That bears repeating: Russia has 7,000 to 12,000 tactical nuclear weapons. The United States today has approximately 1,600. What is going to happen with Russia's tactical nuclear stockpile if NATO expansion goes forward? What will Russia's decisionmaking be about their huge advantage in tactical nuclear weapons?

I am concerned that NATO expansion will hurt the prospect of an agreement on tactical nuclear arms because it will increase Russia's reliance on those very weapons. Russia already sees itself conventionally outmatched by NATO. It has abandoned its nuclear policy of no first use. NATO enlargement will simply increase their insecurity, making them less willing to part with their tactical nuclear weapons. This will mean it will be harder to reduce the threat of theft, sale, or unauthorized use of these weapons.

I will be addressing this issue with an amendment. But first, let me conclude on the question of NATO enlargement.

Mr. President, NATO expansion fails on the four tests that I outlined at the outset of my remarks, leading me to the following conclusions. First, the risks to relations with Russia and arms control are unacceptable. Second, we are not certain what NATO expansion will cost or who will pay for it. Third, there is no compelling argument for why expanding NATO is necessary, especially when there are other alternatives. And, fourth, there is ample reason to conclude that enlargement will have perverse consequences, increasing instability in Eastern Europe and perpetuating the danger from the Russian tactical nuclear arsenal.

Fortunately, it is not too late. Columnist Jim Hoagland in a column in the Washington Post last month said: "The Senate needs an extended debate, not an immediate vote."

Jim Hoagland has it right. We do need an extended debate. There should

not be a rush to judgment. There are serious questions that should be answered.

The Senate, in my judgment, should not give in to the Cold War argument about American credibility being on the line. How many times have we seen that argument called up in this Chamber? When the arguments are weak on behalf of a decision that is already moving forward, we have colleagues who rush to the floor and say, "Oh, it might not be such a good idea, but America's credibility is on the line. Our President has made this commitment, and therefore we must go along to maintain American credibility."

I remember that argument being made in the Vietnam era. It wasn't a good argument then, and it is not a good argument now.

The better course, rather than moving to expand NATO, is to tell the administration we should, first, investigate alternatives to NATO enlargement, such as expansion of the European Union. Second, we should have a new round of hearings when the results of the studies that are required by this resolution are available. That, after all, was the recommendation of former Senators Sam Nunn and Howard Baker. And third, we ought to pursue arms control as our top priority.

As Professor Michael Mandelbaum of Johns Hopkins University has advised us: NATO expansion is at best a distraction from, and at worst a hindrance to, making progress on these issues.

Mr. President, I believe we ought to take Professor Mandelbaum's sound advice. Before we rush headlong into expanding NATO, we ought to think carefully about what is truly in our country's interests.

EXECUTIVE AMENDMENT NO. 2320

(Purpose: To encourage progress on reducing the threat posed by Russia's non-strategic nuclear arsenal)

Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, on a related matter, I would like to at this point lay down my amendment, as provided for in the unanimous consent agreement.

Mr. President, as I have considered NATO enlargement, it seems to me to be clear we need to put the Senate on record during the NATO debate supporting cooperative efforts with the Russians to reduce the threat from Russia's tactical nuclear arsenal.

At the outset, allow me to emphasize that recent years have seen important progress on arms control. Reduced tensions with Moscow have allowed important treaties to be negotiated that have made the world a far safer place. One of the great successes has been the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty. That agreement has eliminated an entire class of nuclear weapons, including the Pershing missiles that this body debated so intensely. The Conventional Forces in Europe treaty has markedly reduced tanks and artillery and armored vehicles in Europe. Two START accords have been negotiated, deeply cutting strategic nuclear forces.

Unfortunately, there have been no arms control treaties on tactical nuclear weapons.

Mr. President, this chart demonstrates the record on arms control. On conventional forces, the red bar shows eastern forces, which during the Cold War were part of the Warsaw Pact. The blue bar shows NATO forces. We can see on conventional forces sharp reductions in the treaty limited equipment of both the old Warsaw Pact and NATO. The same is true under the START accords—dramatic reductions on both sides in strategic systems.

But on tactical forces there has been no treaty. We don't know with any precision what has happened in the former Soviet Union. We don't know what their inventory is.

In 1991 the United States had more than 3,500 tactical weapons in Europe. The U.S.S.R. is estimated to have had around 15,000. In 1991, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev unilaterally pledged to withdraw most tactical nuclear weapons from Europe and begin dismantlement.

Since that time, this country has withdrawn all but around 400 tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, and dismantled all but about 1,600 of our tactical nuclear weapons in total.

The story on the Russian side has been very different. With the collapse of the Soviet empire and a 70 percent reduction in military spending, weapon dismantlement has slowed to a crawl. All former Soviet tactical nuclear weapons have been withdrawn to Russia and placed in storage, but today we don't know how many of those weapons Russia has.

The excellent Nunn-Lugar Program has helped the Russians round up and account for many of these weapons. The fact is, however, we don't know how many they retain.

That arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons is clearly a threat. Because there is not any arms control regime covering tactical nuclear weapons, we are not allowed to inspect, to assess the security of those tactical warheads, and determine their number.

Let's go to the second chart to highlight this point.

In 1991, it is estimated that the U.S.S.R. had 15,000 tactical nuclear weapons—15,000. We had in the range of 3,500 deployed in Europe. Today, we have just over 400 in Europe. But the Russians retain, according to the head of the U.S. Strategic Command, General Habiger, 7,000 to 12,000 tactical nuclear weapons. And yet, arms control agreements do not cover this category of weapons.

On strategic systems, we have come down on both sides, and have come down sharply. The same is true with regard to conventional forces in Europe. But regarding tactical nuclear weapons, there is an enormous disparity. Russia has in the range of 7,000 to 12,000 tactical nuclear weapons. We are down in the range of 400 tactical warheads in Europe, and approximately 1,600 in all.

The lack of a treaty means we have no guarantee that Russia's numbers will come down. The 7,000 to 12,000 tactical nuclear warheads inside Russia present the greatest threat of theft or sale of nuclear warheads in the world today. These constitute the greatest so-called "loose nuke" threat. We have reason to believe that the danger with those tactical warheads is greater than with strategic warheads because tactical weapons are not subject to the START accords. They are largely in storage, not deployed on missiles, bombers, and submarines where they are likely to be better protected.

A recent story in the Jerusalem Post indicated that Iran may have been able to purchase up to four former Soviet nuclear warheads earlier this decade. This report highlights an important danger. Terrorist use of one of these weapons would be devastating. A nuclear blast would make the Oklahoma City fertilizer bomb look like a firecracker. Today, many tactical nuclear warheads have yields that dwarf the device that destroyed Hiroshima in 1945.

Mr. President, this chart tells us something about terrorist use of a tactical nuclear warhead. It tells us how devastating it would be. The fertilizer bomb detonated in Oklahoma City two years ago had a destructive yield in the range of two one-thousandths of a kiloton. The so-called "fat man" atomic bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima, 13 kilotons. Smaller tactical weapons of today can be in the range of 10 kilotons. Some tactical nuclear weapons have been reported to be as small as a suitcase. Some larger tactical nuclear weapons can have a yield of more than 300 kilotons. And remember—Russia has 7,000 to 12,000 tactical nuclear warheads, devices that are not included in any arms control regime. We don't have an accounting. We don't have the accountability that comes with a formal inspection regime.

The threat from Russia's tactical nuclear arsenal is where we ought to be directing our attention. This is what ought to be our top priority. We endanger progress by moving to enlarge NATO at this time.

The other threat is one that has been highlighted by the United States Strategic Command. Strategic warhead levels would likely decline to around 2,250 under a START III accord. An 8-to-1 Russian advantage in tactical warheads becomes a major strategic concern in this environment. Let me direct the Senate's attention to this chart.

The strategic breakout danger has been referenced by some of our top military leaders. The United States, under a START III accord, would likely have 2,250 deployed strategic nuclear warheads. Russia would presumably have the same number. But look what happens on the tactical side. With tactical nuclear weapons, our arsenal would stand at around 1,500. Russia could still be at 7,000 to 12,000 tactical

warheads, an enormous disparity. And that leads to a concern about strategic instability.

This is especially true in light of the fact that the distinction between tactical and strategic weapons has been disappearing. During the early years of the Cold War, large nuclear weapons with yields in the tens of megatons were needed. At that time, our ICBMs and other delivery systems were inaccurate enough that a massive bomb was needed to destroy a target. But as the accuracy of missiles increased, many large multimegaton bombs were replaced with strategic weapons with much smaller yields. Today, for example, the warheads on the MX—or Peacekeeper—have a yield of 350 kilotons.

As the next chart notes, this is in the range of many tactical nuclear weapons today.

During the cold war, many strategic weapons were in the range of 500 kilotons to 10 megatons. Today, tactical weapons can range from 10 kilotons to around 400 kilotons or more. Most of today's strategic weapons are in the range of 300 kilotons to 1 megaton.

So the difference in yield between strategic systems and tactical nuclear systems has been altered dramatically over time. There is much less of a distinction between the yield of strategic warheads and tactical warheads than in the past.

The implication is clear and disturbing. The 7,000 to 12,000 tactical warheads that General Habiger has said the Russians could have are taking on a strategic relevance. I think my colleagues would agree that a massive Russian superiority could be destabilizing.

My amendment would send a clear signal of Senate support for progress on reducing the threat from Russia's tactical nuclear arsenal. It supports the recommendation of General Habiger, the general charged with America's nuclear security, that future arms control initiatives should include tactical warheads.

Let's listen to America's nuclear commander. He says: "The Russians have anywhere from 7,000 to more than 12,000 of these nonstrategic nuclear weapons, and we need to bring them into the equation." This from General Eugene Habiger, Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command.

My amendment is simple and deserves the support of every Senator. Its purpose is to put the Senate on record in the context of the NATO debate as being concerned about the danger of "loose nukes." The strategic implications of Russia's arsenal are also critically important. We should continue to work cooperatively with the Russians to reduce this threat. I believe the dangers in this area require an increased emphasis if we are to be serious about arms control.

I am pleased to be joined by Senator BINGAMAN, the ranking member on the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee, in offering this amendment.

Briefly, my amendment expresses the sense of the Senate that it would be advisable for future nuclear arms control agreements with the Russian Federation to address tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.

And second, the administration should work with the Russian Federation to increase transparency, exchange data, increase warhead security and facilitate weapons dismantlement.

My amendment contains a simple but important certification. Prior to deposit of the instruments of ratification, the administration shall certify to the Senate that, one, with regard to tactical nuclear weapons it is the policy of the United States to work with the Russian Federation to increase transparency, exchange data, increase warhead security and facilitate weapons dismantlement; and that two, discussions toward this end are underway with the Russian Federation.

The administration should be able to meet this certification with little difficulty based on current staff level discussions. Nevertheless, this provision puts the Senate on record and the administration on notice that the Senate is interested and concerned.

Finally, my amendment requires a report within 180 days after deposit of the instruments of ratification on the status of the Russian tactical nuclear arsenal, the threats associated with it, and plans to continue to work cooperatively with the Russian Federation on increasing transparency, exchanging data, increasing warhead security and facilitating weapons dismantlement.

These, Mr. President, ought to be our clear goals.

I also believe this amendment is timely and we need this statement now.

As Senator MOYNIHAN has discussed, Russian officials have said that in the face of an expanding NATO and dwindling Russian conventional forces, they will have to place greater reliance on nuclear weapons. That is a valid concern. Rushing to enlarge NATO could reduce Russia's willingness to cooperate on tactical nuclear arms. NATO expansion could perpetuate the risk of sale or theft of a "loose nuke" and Russia's massive lead over the United States in tactical warheads.

Even if the Senate approves NATO enlargement, we need to keep our eye on the ball. That ball is arms control. My amendment sends a clear and compelling signal to Moscow that we want to continue to work with them to reduce the threat in this area.

Mr. President, I believe there is nothing in this amendment that is a hazard to NATO enlargement. Although I personally oppose enlargement, I believe it would be a serious mistake for the Senate not to pass this amendment. I believe it should be approved.

Mr. President, I thank the Chair and I thank the staff for their patience. I thank my colleagues for this opportunity, and I hope they will support this amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from North Dakota [Mr. CONRAD], for himself and Mr. BINGAMAN, proposes an executive amendment numbered 2320.

Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is as follows:

At the appropriate place in section 3 of the resolution, insert the following:

() NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS—

(A) FINDINGS.—The Senate finds that

(i) the United States Strategic Command has estimated that the Russian Federation has between 7,000 and 12,000 non-strategic nuclear warheads, weapons that—unlike strategic systems—are not covered by any arms control accord;

(ii) the thousands of tactical nuclear warheads inside Russia present the greatest threat of sale or theft of a nuclear weapon in the world today;

(iii) with the number of deployed strategic warheads in the Russian and United States arsenals likely to be reduced to around 2,250 warheads under a START III accord, Russia's vast superiority in tactical nuclear warheads becomes a strategic concern;

(iv) the Commander in Chief of the United States Strategic Command has stated that future nuclear arms control agreements should address tactical nuclear weapons;

(v) statements from Russian officials that NATO enlargement would force Russia to rely more heavily on its nuclear arsenal have caused concern that NATO expansion could be an impediment to progress on tactical nuclear arms control; and,

(vi) the danger of theft or sale of a tactical nuclear warhead, and the destabilizing strategic implications of Russia's enormous lead in tactical nuclear weapons creates an urgent need for progress on increasing the security of Russia's tactical nuclear arsenal and working toward conclusion of a US-Russian agreement on tactical nuclear arms in Europe.

(B) SENSE OF THE SENATE.—It is the Sense of the Senate that

(i) it would be advisable for future nuclear arms control agreements with the Russian Federation to address non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe; and,

(ii) the Administration should work with the Russian Federation to increase transparency, exchange data, increase warhead security, and facilitate weapon dismantlement.

(C) CERTIFICATION.—Prior to the deposit of the instruments of ratification, the Administration shall certify to the Senate that with regard to non-strategic nuclear weapons

(i) it is the policy of the United States to work with the Russian Federation to increase transparency, exchange data, increase warhead security, and facilitate weapon dismantlement; and,

(ii) that discussions toward these ends have been initiated with the Russian Federation.

(D) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the deposit of the instruments of ratification, the President shall submit a report to the Senate on the Russian Federation's non-strategic nuclear arsenal. This report shall include

(i) current data and estimates regarding the current numbers, types, yields, and locations of Russia's nonstrategic nuclear weapons;

(ii) an assessment of the extent of the current threat of theft, sale, or unauthorized use of such warheads;

(iii) a plan to work with the Russian Federation to increase transparency, exchange data, increase warhead security, and facilitate weapon dismantlement; and,

(iv) an assessment of the strategic implications of the Russian Federation's non-strategic arsenal.

Mr. CONRAD. I yield the floor.

ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 11 A.M. TOMORROW

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now stand in adjournment until 11 a.m., Thursday, April 30, 1998.

Thereupon, the Senate, at 7:52 p.m., adjourned until Thursday, April 30, 1998, at 11 a.m.

NOMINATIONS

Executive nominations received by the Senate April 29, 1998:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MICHAEL CRAIG LEMMON, OF FLORIDA, A CAREER MEMBER OF THE SENIOR FOREIGN SERVICE, CLASS OF COUNSELOR, TO BE AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY AND PLENIPOTENTIARY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA.

RUDOLF VILEM PERINA, OF CALIFORNIA, A CAREER MEMBER OF THE SENIOR FOREIGN SERVICE, CLASS OF MINISTER-COUNSELOR, TO BE AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY AND PLENIPOTENTIARY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA.

THE JUDICIARY

LYNETTE NORTON, OF PENNSYLVANIA, TO BE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA VICE MAURICE B. COHILL, JR., RETIRED.

JEFFREY G. STARK, OF NEW YORK, TO BE A JUDGE OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, VICE R. KENTON MUSGRAVE, RETIRED.

IN THE AIR FORCE

THE FOLLOWING AIR NATIONAL GUARD OF THE UNITED STATES OFFICER FOR APPOINTMENT IN THE RESERVE OF THE AIR FORCE TO THE GRADE INDICATED UNDER TITLE 10, U.S.C., SECTION 12203:

To be brigadier general

COL. ARCHIE J. BERBERIAN, II, 0000

THE FOLLOWING NAMED RESERVE OFFICER FOR APPOINTMENT AS CHIEF OF THE AIR FORCE RESERVE UNDER TITLE 10, U.S.C., SECTION 8038:

To be chief of the Air Force Reserve, United States Air Force

MAJ. GEN. JAMES E. SHERRARD, III, 0000

IN THE NAVY

THE FOLLOWING NAMED OFFICER FOR APPOINTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES NAVY TO THE GRADE INDICATED WHILE ASSIGNED TO A POSITION OF IMPORTANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY UNDER TITLE 10, U.S.C., SECTION 601:

To be admiral

VICE ADM. RICHARD W. MIES, 0000

THE FOLLOWING NAMED OFFICER FOR APPOINTMENT AS CHIEF OF CHAPLAINS AND FOR APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE INDICATED UNDER TITLE 10, U.S.C., SECTION 5142:

To be rear admiral

REAR ADM. (LH) ANDERSON B. HOLDERBY, JR., 0000

IN THE ARMY

THE FOLLOWING NAMED OFFICERS, FOR APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE INDICATED IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY AND FOR REGULAR APPOINTMENT IN THE ARMY NURSE CORPS, MEDICAL SERVICE CORPS, ARMY MEDICAL SPECIALIST CORPS, AND VETERINARY CORPS (IDENTIFIED BY AN ASTERISK (*)) UNDER TITLE 10, U.S.C. SECTION 624, 531 AND 3064:

To be Lieutenant Colonel

EUGENE N. ACOSTA, 0000
*JULIA A. ADAMS, 0000
JAMES R. ALARCON, 0000
DONALD T. ALBEE, JR., 0000
WANDA K. ALLENHUBERT, 0000
FRIDA G. ATWOOD, 0000
PAUL T. BARTONE, 0000
TIMOTHY E. BATEMAN, 0000
GASTON P. BATHALON, 0000

MICHAEL K. BAYLES, 0000
STEPHEN G. BEARDSLEY III, 0000
EDWARD B. BERNARD, 0000
JOHN A. BIRNER, 0000
DOUGLAS A. BOOM, 0000
CYNTHIA F. BROWN, 0000
MARK R. BRUINS, 0000
SCOTT A. BURGESS, 0000
JOYCE W. BURNS, 0000
HOWARD L. BURTNETT, 0000
VICKY CAMPBELLHEMMING, 0000
JAMES W. CARTWRIGHT, JR., 0000
PATRICE E. CHANDLER, 0000
*CATHY J. CHESS, 0000
MARK A. CHIN, 0000
MICHAEL S. CHURCH, 0000
ALLISON P. CLARK III, 0000
WAYNE W. CLARK, 0000
BRENDA C. CONWAY, 0000
KAYLENE M. CURTIS, 0000
*MARK K. DAVIS, 0000
PATRICK O. DEAN, 0000
JOHN B. DEVITA, 0000
BRIAN J. DICIANCIA, 0000
*HAROLD C. DICKENS, 0000
DENNIS D. DOYLE, 0000
THEODORE ECKERT, III, 0000
JENNIFER M. ECTOR, 0000
CAROLYN A. EDDINGS, 0000
*CAROL L. EISENHAEUER, 0000
ELEANOR M. FENNELL, 0000
HUBERT M. FISCHER, 0000
JOHN B. FOLEY, 0000
ELLEN E. FORSTER, 0000
DAVID E. FULBRIGHT, 0000
JOHN A. GIDDENS, 0000
PATRICIA L. GOGGINS, 0000
*DONALD L. GOODE, 0000
*PATRICIA A. GUSTAFSON, 0000
HOGSTON S. HAGA, 0000
*JTMAL B. HALES, 0000
JAMES R. HALLIBURTON, 0000
RONALD R. HAMILTON, 0000
DAN E. HARMS, 0000
CHRISTOPHER J. HARRINGTON, 0000
PATRICIA A. HARRINGTON, 0000
MARGARET A. HAWTHORNE, 0000
MARK W. HEGERLE, 0000
TERRENCE J. HEIDENREITER, 0000
JAMES R. HICKEY, 0000
ELIZABETH J. HIGGINS, 0000
MARK D. HINES, 0000
SHELLA A. HOBBS, 0000
ANN K. HOCHHAUSEN, 0000
*JOYCE A. HOHNER, 0000
RAY E. HORN, JR., 0000
STEVEN D. HUNTE, 0000
JEREMY P. HUTTON, 0000
NICHOLAS H. INMAN, 0000
ANNA R. IUNGERICH, 0000
LILLIAN L. JENNINGS, 0000
CAROLYN J. JOHNSON, 0000
ELIZABETH A. JOHNSON, 0000
ALAN E. JONES, 0000
TEMPSIE L. JONES, 0000
HYACINTH J. JOSEPH, 0000
RONALD S. KEEN, 0000
*DEBORAH J. KENNY, 0000
JULIA M. KIRK, 0000
CORNEL L. KITTELL, 0000
CAROL A. KORODY, 0000
TIMOTHY E. LAMB, 0000
VERGEL C. LAYAO, 0000
FRANCINE M. LEDOUX, 0000
*ROBERT J. LEE, 0000
CASSANDRA L. LEWIS, 0000
VASEAL M. LEWIS, 0000
STEPHEN W. LOMAX, 0000
ANGEL L. LUGO, 0000
GEORGE J. MAGNON, 0000
ROGER B. MARCIL, 0000
PAMLEA J. MARTIN, 0000
WENDY L. MARTINSON, 0000
MARK R. MASON, 0000
JILL E. MCCOY, 0000
*CLEM D. MCDUFFIE, 0000
JOANNE E. MCGOVERN, 0000
GREGORY A. MCKEE, 0000
FUJIO MCPHERSON, 0000
AWILDA MEEKS, 0000
ZIA A. MEHR, 0000
MARK G. MENSE, 0000
WILLIAM J. MIKLOSEY, JR., 0000
JAMES T. MILLER, 0000
SHIRLEY M. MILLER, 0000
CONSTANCE J. MOORE, 0000
MICHAEL L. MOORE, 0000
JOHN H. MORSE, 0000
OPHELIA MUNN, 0000
ULMONT C. NANTON, JR., 0000
WILLIAM F. NAUSCHUETZ, 0000
TIMOTHY A. NEWCOMER, 0000
DEBORAH M. NEWSOME, 0000
RICHARD A. NICHOLS, 0000
*RONNIE L. NYE, 0000
JEREMY L. OLSON, 0000
MARILYN E. OSBORNE, 0000
MARILOU D. OVERLA, 0000
*PATRICK L. PALMER, 0000
WILLIAM R. PARLETT, JR., 0000
*ROSS H. PASTEL, 0000
ANGELA PEREIRA, 0000
MARK J. PERRY, 0000
DOUGLAS S. PHELPS, 0000
PEARL R. POPE, 0000
MARSHA A. PRINCE, 0000
PRISCILLA E. QUACKENBUSH, 0000

ANTONIO F. REYES, 0000
JAMES S. RICE, 0000
SALLY ROBERTSON, 0000
FRANKLIN D. ROWLAND, JR., 0000
RODGER J. RUDOLPH, 0000
*MICHAEL L. RUSSELL, 0000
PAULA J. RUTAN, 0000
DIANA L. RUZICKA, 0000
*PAUL W. SCHMIDT, 0000
*DEBRA D. SCHNELLE, 0000
EDWARD R. SCHOWALTER III, 0000
SUSAN M. SCHRENTHALER, 0000
PETER J. SCHULTHEISS, 0000
*PATRICK G. SESTO, 0000
LAWRENCE E. SHAW, 0000
KEITH E. SICKAFOOSE II, 0000
ARLENE SIMMONS, 0000
JOHN C. SLATTERY, 0000
MARY E. SMITH, 0000
MICHAEL L. SMITH, 0000
STANLEY E. SMITH, 0000
*JAIME E. SORIA, 0000
*JEFFERY C. SPRINGER, 0000
FATEMEH T. STRITMATTER, 0000
VICKY L. THOMAS, 0000
SHERYL A. TOYER, 0000
DALE G. VANDERHAMM, 0000
DEBBIE J. VASUT, 0000
*MINNIE R. WALLER, 0000
ROBERT V. WARD, 0000
MARY A. WARREN, 0000
DIANE M. WEINBAUM, 0000
RANDY W. WEISHAAR, 0000
DAVID F. WEST, 0000
ANDREW C. WHELEN, 0000
JONI L. WILLIAMS, 0000
PATRICK O. WILSON, 0000
*JAMES E. YAFFE, 0000
CURTIS L. YEAGER, 0000

IN THE MARINE CORPS

THE FOLLOWING NAMED OFFICER FOR APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE INDICATED IN THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS UNDER TITLE 10, U.S.C., SECTION 624:

To be major

GARY F. BAUMANN, 0000

THE FOLLOWING NAMED LIMITED DUTY OFFICERS FOR APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE INDICATED IN THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS UNDER TITLE 10, U.S.C., SECTION 624:

To be lieutenant colonel

MICHAEL L. ANDREWS, 0000
EVERETT J. BOUDREAU, 0000
ARNOLD J. COPOSKY, 0000
ROY V. DANIELS, 0000
RONALD W. ELLINGER, 0000
GARY E. ENGELKING, 0000
JAMES B. EUSSE, 0000
GEORGE E. FOLTA, 0000
WILLIAM H. HAGUE, 0000
WILLIAM L. HENSLEE, 0000
SCOTTY W. MONTAGUE, 0000
STEPHEN H. NEGAHNQUET, 0000
MILTON L. PETERSON, 0000
RAYMOND O. THOMAS, 0000
ROBERT C. WITTENBERG, 0000

THE FOLLOWING NAMED OFFICERS FOR APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE INDICATED IN THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS UNDER TITLE 10, U.S.C., SECTION 624:

To be major

JAMES N. ADAMS, 0000
BRIAN T. ALEXANDER, 0000
KELLY P. ALEXANDER, 0000
JEFFREY S. ALLEN, 0000
CHRISTOPHER J. ALPERT, 0000
CINO P. AMOROSO, 0000
WALTER T. ANDERSON, 0000
BRIAN P. ANNICHARICO, 0000
PAUL E. ASLOW, 0000
CHRISTOPHER A. ARANTZ, 0000
JAMES L. ARMSTRONG, 0000
THOMAS E. ARNOLD, JR., 0000
SOREN P. ASHMALL, 0000
FINLEY M. ASMUS, 0000
WALTER W. AUDSLEY, 0000
EUGENE M. AUGUSTINE, JR., 0000
MARY A. AUGUSTITUS, 0000
CURTIS D. AVERY, 0000
DAVID D. BADGER, 0000
BRIAN F. BAKER, 0000
FRANCISCO M. BALL, 0000
CRAIG P. BARDEN, 0000
BRUCE W. BARNHILL, 0000
MICHAEL R. BARRETT, 0000
BRIAN S. BARTHOLOMEW, 0000
JAMES G. BARTOLOTTI, 0000
MATTHEW C. BAUGHARTEN, 0000
PETER B. BAUMGARTEN, 0000
TERRANCE A. BEATTY, 0000
JESSE D. BELSON, 0000
JESSE C. BENTON, 0000
MICHAEL J. BERGERUD, 0000
PAUL F. BERTHOLF, 0000
LLOYD J. BIGGS, 0000
JOHN A. BINGER, JR., 0000
MICHAEL W. BINNEY, 0000
ELIZABETH S. BIRCH, 0000
DAVID J. BLIGH, 0000
ROY M. BLIZZARD III, 0000
KERRY J. BLOCK, 0000
HAROLD W. BLOT, JR., 0000